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Abstract 
Executive turnover can have far-reaching consequences on a local authority’s development policies, 
programs and commitments. This paper examines nebulous labour-related problems in Zimbabwe’s 
Rural District Councils (RDCs). The article chronicles the origins of the problems and how the RDCs 
have fallen prey to historical pitfalls. This paper critically reflects on the recruitment and dismissal of 
senior Rural District Council officers. The article analyses the longevity of CEOs in eight RDCs over 
a ten year period. The results demonstrate the sensitivity and vulnerability of such offices, and unpack 
the blurry boundaries that lie between policies and practice and the resultant impact on the labour 
relationships with RDC staff.   
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Introduction 
The effective management of human resources is a sine qua non condition for any organisation 
aiming for a mature and mutually respectful labour relationship with its staff. Effective human 
resource management is vital for the local state as it grapples with monumental development 
challenges, and whilst the exit of staff may create space for new blood, the old adage ‘old broom 
knows all the corners’ holds true. McCabe et al (2008) argue that executive turnover can have far-
reaching consequences on a local authority’s development policies, programs and commitments. They 
analysed turnover patterns of council executives in large American councils to distinguish 'push' and 
'pull' factors that induce council managers to leave their jobs, and concluded that political conflict and 
economic development can influence the likelihood that a council manager will leave. Grindle (1997) 
examined how staff were educated and attracted to public sector careers, and the utilisation and 
retention of individuals in the public sector, focussing on managerial, professional and technical staff 
and the extent to which career trajectories affect overall performance. This paper adopts a similar 
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approach, examining managerial employees in Zimbabwe’s Rural District Councils (RDCs) as key 
actors responsible for development in rural constituencies.  
Why are these described as nebulous labour relations?  
To set the context, we need to unpack the concepts – 'nebulous’ and 'labour relations'. The Concise 
Oxford Dictionary (2000) describes ‘nebulous’ as hazy, vague, indistinct, confused, cloudy or 
cloudlike. Trebilcock (1998) defines the term ‘labour relations’ (also known as industrial relations) as 
the system in which employers, workers and their representatives and the government, interact to set 
the ground rules for the governance of work relationships. The concept also describes a field of study 
dedicated to examining such relationships. Trebilcock (1998) further contends that the phrase ‘labour 
relations’ can also encompass individual employment relationships between an employer and a 
worker under a written or implied contract of employment. 
Based on the author’s twelve years of experience in Rural District Councils (RDCs) and the intense 
research and ensuing analysis, this paper argues that labour relations in Zimbabwe’s RDCs were 
nebulous. As the winds of change blow over Zimbabwe in the post-crisis era (2009), it is our fervent 
hope that lessons learnt will be useful as the country embraces change and the much-sought 
administrative effectiveness.   
The paper does not claim to be exhaustive on labour relations but is a modest contribution to the gaps 
and growing literature on labour relations in local government, public administration and cognate 
disciplines. This paper will provide institutional memory and add to knowledge or change prior 
beliefs. Indeed, there is a possibility of making a contribution that solidifies knowledge as Zimbabwe 
finds its feet in the post-crisis era. 
McCabe et al (2008) argue that turnover in top administrative positions has been linked to 
management difficulties in public, private, and non-profit organizations, and that in the private sector, 
a great deal of research indicates that turnover has critical effects on an organization’s performance 
and remaining personnel. It is thus axiomatic that executive turnover should also prove important in 
the public sector. At the local government level, turnover disrupts the relationship structures on which 
local governance depends. Council manager turnover is especially important because leaders play 
increasingly complex and interrelated roles in both the substance and the process of local governance. 
McCabe et al (2008) further posit that turnover among managers is often attributed to 'push' or 'pull' 
factors. Push factors prompt managers to leave their current positions because of political conflict or 
differences in style, orientation, or policy between the managers and their councils. Pull factors entice 
managers to leave their current positions for professional, financial, or personal advancement. 
McCabe et al (2008) strongly suggest that change from one council manager to another has significant 
policy implications if different managers bring different preferences, skills, and backgrounds to the 
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job. Among other things, turnover affects a council’s implementation of local innovations such as 
experimentation with new service delivery approaches.  
Zimbabwe’s Rural District Councils (RDCs) depend on salaried executives for the day-to-operations 
of their activities and implementation of their development policies. This article sketches an overview 
of the development of labour relations in Zimbabwe. To illustrate nebulousness, the paper examines 
eight selected
1
 RDCs from eight Provinces and shows how they have been entangled in the cobweb of 
labour relations. With passage of time, labour relations regulations in RDCs have been streamlined, 
but what remains is the inability of the actors to encompass the lessons learnt and engage in 
meaningful dialogue. The study finds that in the case of Zimbabwe’s RDCs, push factors were more 
dominant than pull factors, which is highly symptomatic of the volatile political climate under which 
RDCs operate. 
Methodology 
There are sixty RDCs in Zimbabwe, and to study the whole population was impractical, so the study 
sampled eight RDCs from four (of the eight) provinces: Mashonaland Central, Manicaland, Midlands 
and Matebeleland South for a good geographical representation. The study examined one suspended 
council, or so-called ‘laggard’, in each province and one of those said to be doing well 
(‘progressive’).2 It also considered the amalgamation mix in 1993 (ie: how many Rural Councils and 
District Councils had amalgamated to make up the RDC) and political history and affiliation (pro- or 
anti- Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front − ZANU PF) (Mandiyanike 2009b).  The 
research included semi-structured interviews with key informants, and examination of official records 
and documentation. Primary data included field study observations and reflections on personal 
experiences of key informants. (See Mandiyanike 2006 and 2009b for a detailed methodological 
justification).  
Historical Overview 
Zimbabwe has been through a very rough political and economic patch in what has been dubbed the 
‘Zimbabwe crisis’ 1999 to 2009. The Zimbabwean political landscape has considerably shifted from a 
one-party system to a plural one, where the Movement for Democratic Change is part of the 
government machinery. The Minister of Local Government has acknowledged this plurality for the 
benefit of all. Mutizwa-Mangiza (1991) and Mandiyanike (2006) contend that until independence in 
                                                          
1 This paper draws from my doctoral research that examined critically the performance of rural local authorities in 
Zimbabwe over a period of ten years (from 1993 to 2003). The performance of local authorities had been 
progressively declining. Money, equipment and other resources were made available through the Rural District 
Council Capacity Building Program (RDCCBP) and other donor-funded programs to salvage the RDCs, but the 
downward trend still persisted. I was thus questioning whether there was any ‘capacity building’ or ‘capacity 
erosion’? Was there a willingness to build lasting capacity or it was being driven by donor conditionality? 
2 The councils were suspended from office by the Ministry of Local Government. The ‘progressive’ ones were also 
appraised by the same ministry. 
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1980, local government in Zimbabwe was divided racially, based on the principle of ‘separate 
development’, a Rhodesian3 formulation of apartheid. Rural Councils catered for white settlers in 
commercial farming areas and District Councils covered the villages where the black majority lived. 
This arrangement existed for almost five decades and in 1993, these Local Government Units (LGUs) 
were amalgamated to form Rural District Councils (Mandiyanike 2009a). Amalgamation was a 
political decision meant to remove one of the last vestiges of colonial rule – the de-racialisation of 
local government (Mandiyanike 2009a) –  which took place under the Rural District Councils Act 
No.8, passed in 1988 but not implemented until July 1993 (Mandiyanike 2006; Matyszak, 2010). The 
transition to the new dispensation was fraught with resistance from the respective contenders and 
haggling among members of staff. The five-year delay in effecting the provisions of the RDC Act was, 
among other explanations, testimony to the complexity of the exercise that sought to unify two very 
different institutions at different levels of sophistication that were intended from inception for 
different purposes (Mandiyanike 2006; 2009a). The paper will set in context by examining pre-
independence labour relations and the scene after 1990.
4
 The paper will also explore the first RDC 
labour test case, whose interpretation had far-reaching implications for all RDCs as they dealt with 
labour issues.  
Pre-independence and Pre-ESAP Labour Relations 
In pre-independent Zimbabwe, the Industrial Conciliation Act 1934 guided labour relations from the 
1930s. Lloyd (1993) argued that soon after independence in 1980, the government brought about 
several changes to the law, among them, the Employment Act 1980 which took away an employer’s 
right to dismiss employees at will. 
However shortly afterwards, the government turned its attention to providing an entirely new Act to 
govern labour relations and in December 1985, the Labour Relations Act 1985 (now Labour Act 
Chapter 28:01) came into operation. Lloyd (1993) argued that the Labour Relations Act caused quite a 
stir, especially among employers, who saw it being weighted in favour of the employee. The 
government’s position (then) can be explained in terms of its Marxist-Leninist leanings. In the period 
1980–1989 central government assumed control of the termination of employment, for disciplinary 
reasons
5
 and ensured that this could be affected through the Ministry of Labour. However, with the 
global political-economic trends, the government’s position changed. Lloyd (1993) conceded that in 
1989 the government began to loosen its grip on labour relations and promulgated regulations that 
encouraged more employer-employee interaction.  
                                                          
3 Rhodesia – colonial name for Zimbabwe 
4 When Zimbabwe adopted an Economic Structural Adjustment Program. 
5 Statutory Instrument 371 of 1985 (Termination of Employment) Regulations was the primary instrument for such 
cases. 
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Personnel Systems in General 
Nabaho (2012) proposes three types of personnel systems for managing providers of decentralized 
services: an integrated personnel system, a unified personnel system and a separate personnel system.  
In an integrated personnel system, local government is composed of central government civil 
servants, with central and local government personnel forming part of the same service, with transfers 
possible between both tiers. The system implies ‘deconcentration’ rather than ‘devolution’ of the civil 
service. Nabaho (2012) argues that one of the noticeable features of the integrated personnel system is 
that a dichotomy between central and local government cadres is non-existent. Central government 
appoints and posts officers to local authorities to meet service delivery needs from the central pool. 
In a separate personnel system, each local government acts as a completely autonomous employer 
(Mawhood 1993; Nabaho 2012). In principle, each local government appoints and administers 
personnel who are not transferable to another jurisdiction. Nabaho (2012) asserts that the separate 
personnel framework is preferred under decentralization by devolution because:  
(a) It keeps the employees’ loyalty unidirectional, ie: to the local government that has the right to 
hire and fire;  
(b) Staff appointed locally gives quicker feedback since they are appointed to meet their 
employer’s developmental needs, and proximity makes them more accountable to constituents 
through the elected local leadership. This is unlikely in integrated personnel systems where dual 
allegiance is common especially for senior officials. 
In some cases, a separate personnel system does not always mean that terms and conditions of service 
of central and local government employees are different.  For example in Uganda Section 61(1) of the 
Local Government Act (Cap 243) states that: ‘The terms and conditions of service of local government 
staff shall conform to those prescribed by the Public Service Commission for the public service 
generally’, while in Kenya, prior to the promulgation of the 2010 Constitution, the terms and 
conditions of local government civil servants were different from those of central government and 
were negotiated between local governments and trade unions (Nabaho 2012). 
Nabaho 2012 follows Olowu’s 2001 argument that the unified personnel approach is a midway 
house between the extremes of integrated and separate personnel arrangements and is a personnel 
model in which some or all categories of local government staff constitute follow a national career 
service (Nabaho 2012; Olowu 2001). In unified personnel arrangements, local government staff are 
employed locally but organized nationwide into a single civil service parallel to the central one 
(Mawhood 1993). In a typical unified system, all local government civil servants are members of a 
national ‘local government civil service’ but are only transferable between local governments.  
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In the case of Zimbabwe’s RDCs, the separate personnel system is used. With a highly centralised 
government structure, the next section will discuss the involvement of government operatives within 
the RDCs’ labour relations.   
Post-19906 Labour Relations in RDCS 
 Until amalgamation in 1993, District Administrators (DAs) had been de jure CEOs for District 
Councils (Mandiyanike 2006; Hammar 2003). The office of the DA falls directly under the Ministry 
of Local Government, and is totally separate from the RDC and increasingly plays a supervisory role.  
After 1 July 1993, the nascent RDCs were expected to recruit their own CEOs and DAs would revert 
to their usual roles as representatives for central government policies representing the authority of 
Government within any given District.  
Thus, in the pre-1989 era (as described above), RDC employees were generally taken to be employees 
of the state (civil servants). The District Administrator (DA) was the de jure Chief Executive Officer 
(CEO), and so conditions of service for RDC staff were almost equated to those of the staff at the 
DA’s office. RDC employees were treated differently, and they were given lesser status than those 
working in the DA’s office. Before amalgamation, councils received salary grants from the Ministry 
of Local Government and National Housing (MLGNH). Thus, the conditions of service were not 
debatable or subject to collective bargaining (a cardinal factor in labour relations), and recruitment 
and dismissal were subject to the approval of the Minister of Local Government. Because of their 
daily involvement, the DA
7
 and his/her staff were able to exercise immense power, and councillors 
could not stand their ground against ‘the minister’s representative’ (the DA who was also better 
educated and earned a high salary). The colonial imprint of the DA also had a bearing on this 
deference.  
In this scenario, labour relations were very lopsided. However, many DAs had limited knowledge of 
labour relations and their advice to councils hinged very much on their (mis)application of Public 
Service Regulations to council staff. Council workers were considered as ‘government employees’ 
(civil servants) and could be fired willy-nilly or could become frustrated leading to resignation. 
During day-to-day discussions, one could often hear reference to some unstated ‘public service 
regulations’, while in most cases there was very little contestation from employees because of the 
authoritarian nature of the regime. 
Following amalgamation in 1993, DAs were no longer mandatory CEOs, salary grants had been 
significantly reduced, and RDCs could set their own salaries (although they tended to align them with 
                                                          
6 See footnote 4. 
7 Mandiyanike (2006) argued that Zimbabwe inherited from the Rhodesian era powerful, centralised state 
bureaucracies staffed by Rhodesian personnel, ‘including the mighty District Administrators (DA).’ The DA was 
feared. When local people visited the DA’s office, they had to remove their hats from quite a distance and other 
unduly officious etiquette. 
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civil service rates). Labour relationships continued to be heavy-handed. With the diversity of staff 
taken over at amalgamation and the emotive manner in which RDC decisions were made cracks began 
to emerge and disciplinary cases were on the rise. In an article to an ARDC Newsletter (2000; p5) I 
argued that: 
The manner in which RDC decisions are made to fire or retain staff is a sobering thought. 
In the council chamber, if one member shouts ‘ngaaende!’ (she/he must go) it becomes a 
chorus – ngaaende! If the culprit has a fair share of sympathisers (personal, religious, 
totem and other patronage whims indubitably take precedence), the decision takes a new 
twist and can be subject to voting. 
In the above scenario, decision-makers tended to be guided by emotions rather than facts. 
RDC Test Case 
1992 saw the test case that radically changed the labour relations landscape. The Labour Relations Act 
No. 16 of 1985, in Section 3, provides that 'This Act shall apply to all employers and all employees 
except those whose conditions of employment are otherwise provided for by or under the 
Constitution'. In the case of Gumbo v Norton-Selous Rural Council 1992 (2), the Zimbabwe Law 
Report (ZLR) 403 (S) stated that the Norton-Selous Rural Council dismissed Mr. Gumbo (an 
engineer) in 1991. Lloyd (1994) noted that the council did not obtain the prior written approval of the 
Minister of Labour, Manpower Planning and Social Welfare. It was contended, in light of Statutory 
Instrument (S.I) 371 of 1985,
8
 that the dismissal was unlawful and void. The Judge sought first to 
answer the question whether an officer of Norton-Selous Rural Council was an employee 'whose 
conditions of employment were provided for by or under the constitution', for him to decide whether 
the Minister of Labour’s approval was necessary.  
Lloyd (1994) contends that the judge went on to look at the categories of people covered by the 
phrase 'except those whose conditions of employment are otherwise provided for by or under the 
Constitution' These were members of the Public Service, the Zimbabwe Republic Police, the Defence 
Forces of Zimbabwe, the Prison Services, Judges, Ombudsman, Attorney General, Comptroller and 
Auditor-General, the President, Ministers and the Speaker of the House. What then was the position 
of Mr. Gumbo, an officer of a Rural Council, whose tenure of office was not regulated by the 
Constitution but by the Rural Councils Act?
9
 The Judge cited instances where other Acts explicitly 
excluded their employees from the ambit of the Labour Relations Act, for example, the Parastatals 
Commission Act 1987 and the Urban Councils Act (chapter 214) as amended in 1986 (consent of the 
Minister of Local Government to fire an Urban Council employee was made acceptable as an 
                                                          
8 In terms of subsection 2 and 3 of Statutory Instrument 375 of 1985: “No employer shall, summarily or otherwise, 
terminate a contract of employment with an employee unless – a) he has obtained the prior written approval of the 
Minister (of Labour) to do so … the contract of employment is terminated in terms of section 3 (which provides for 
suspension pending a ruling by a Labour Relations Officer. 
9 The Rural Councils Act (Chapter 211), though repealed by the Rural District Councils Act No.8 of 1988 continues to 
exist for the purposes of this case. 
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alternative to the Minister of Labour). Apparently no change had been brought about in respect of 
RDCs (Lloyd, 1994). Thus, the case concluded by upholding that the prior written approval of the 
Minister of Labour, Manpower Planning and Social Welfare was necessary before Mr. Gumbo could 
be lawfully dismissed. 
Implications of the Gumbo Case for RDCS 
The Gumbo case had far reaching implications for RDCs, District Administrators (DAs), the Minister 
of Local Government and other politicians. RDCs have continued to disregard the due processes of 
law, making haphazard decisions in the hiring and firing of RDC employees, flouting procedures and 
pandering to the dictates of politicians, as illustrated in the selected RDCs. RDCs have continued to 
lose cases at the labour offices for simply not following provisions of the law and tenets of natural 
justice. 
In the liberalised economy, Statutory Instrument 379, 1990, provided for the establishment of 
Employment Codes of Conduct. These form the rules of engagement between employer and 
employees, who have to agree in writing to the code. If endorsed by the Minister of Labour, there will 
be no need for disciplinary cases to be referred to the Labour Officer. Very few RDCs managed to 
register their codes of conduct.  
At amalgamation, Statutory Instrument (SI) 170, 1993, stipulated that no officer or employee was to 
lose his/her job because of amalgamation. Everyone had to be accommodated and vacancies had to be 
offered to members of staff
10
 already working in the amalgamated RDC(s). Some DAs and/or their 
officers applied for the CEO positions with differing results. In some RDCs, for example, Guruve, 
Mazowe and Umzingwane, DAs were offered the CEO positions because they were suitably qualified, 
or possibly because of councils’ fear of a backlash from the Minister of Local Government, however 
they turned down the job offers because the salaries were lower than their current earnings.
11
  This 
stance saw Senior Executive Officers (SEOs) (from the District Council) or Council Secretaries (from 
the Rural Council) being appointed to CEO positions, even though some of them were not 
appropriately qualified for the added responsibilities. The jostling for key council positions 
exacerbated the hitherto tense relationship between and among DAs, and aspiring District Council and 
Rural Council candidates. This was characteristic of a Hobbesian state of war of all against all.    
Following the erratic appointment of CEOs and other council heads of department after amalgamation 
and the wave of scandals that hit many RDCs in 1997/98, in September 1999 the Secretary for Local 
                                                          
10 There was also a skewed interpretation in some RDCs that the DAs were to be considered if they applied, 
particularly in RDCs that rich with a strong resource base. 
11 For example, Umzingwane RDC special Full Council meeting No.12 (24/11/94) made a conditional offer to Gumbo 
who was DA-Esigodini (colonial name for Umzingwane) and was also the Acting CEO. Guruve RDC offered the CEO 
position to Felix Mhishi, a local indigene who was then DA of Gutu District. 
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Government and National Housing issued Local Authority Circular No. 205 of 1999 outlining entry 
qualifications for CEOs and Finance departmental heads. The circular read: 
The Ministry, having carefully assessed and evaluated the overall performance of RDCs 
since amalgamation, has found it imperative to prescribe a new recruitment policy with 
respect to the post of CEO and Finance Head. While statutory instrument 170 of 1993 did 
not precisely stipulate any academic or professional entry qualifications to any office at 
council, this status quo is no longer sustainable in light of the civic complexities and 
intricacies resultant of today’s global demands. Thus, with immediate effect, all offices of 
the CEO and finance head falling vacant shall be offered only to persons in possession of 
one or a combination of the following plus a minimum of three years of relevant experience 
… a degree or higher national diploma … failure to comply with the foregoing minimum 
stipulations on the part of Council shall invariably result in the Minister disapproving the 
recommended appointment. 
This scenario resonates with the comments by Oyugi (1993; p.129) on Kenyan local government in 
the 1960s, where he observed that the Minister of Local Government had the power to approve the 
appointment of senior officers, as their salaries and benefits and dismissals had to be endorsed by the 
Minister. In Zimbabwe, RDC employees, though under the tutelage of the Minister of Local 
Government, can only be dismissed with the blessing of the Minister of Labour unless they are 
working to a Code of Conduct approved by the Minister of Labour. This aspect that the Zimbabwean 
powers-that-be have to think about seriously.  
Oyugi (1993; p.129) argued that the power of an organisation to choose its own staff was an essential 
ingredient for decentralisation. It is unfortunate that through this ‘veto power’ that the Ministry of 
Local Government may exercise unfettered power that may create divided loyalties among staff. 
Mawhood (1993) observed that this ‘divided loyalty’ was rife in councils that did not get on well with 
the Ministry of Local Government. In my view, the senior officers often found themselves in 
awkward situations as they trod finely between the ministry and their council. This element of 
cronyism and victimisation inevitably led to job insecurity.
12
  
Amidst this controversy, the following section attempts to explore what happened to CEOs a decade 
after amalgamation – to establish the rate of turnover. From the literature surveyed and cases 
examined, the paper concludes by arguing that labour relations in Zimbabwe’s RDCs have been 
highly politicised and that Ministers of Local Government have fuelled the confusion and propagated 
unfair labour practices in the RDCs. This was further compounded by a murky legal framework. The 
next section will examine the recruitment and retention of the first CEOs after amalgamation and the 
controversy surrounding their employment. 
 
                                                          
12
 Oyugi (1993; p.130) brought out very illuminating cases from Kenya on the abuse of the employing power. He argued 
that “a chairman would disagree with an officer (say the officer opposes illegality or malpractice). At once, he [chairman] 
begins to mobilise other councillors against that officer, thus, preparing him for dismissal. They may bring in their own 
cronies who may suffer the same fate when the chairman vacates office.” 
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First CEOs after Amalgamation 
The first CEOs appointed for Mazowe, Bindura and Chirumhanzu were from the amalgamating Rural 
Councils. Whilst educational qualifications were considered (in any case they were not better 
educated than their District Council counterparts), this study established through interviews with 
council staff that the decision on whom to appoint showed the dominant nature of the amalgamating 
Rural Councils and the appeasing nature of the amalgamating District Councils, having satisfied 
themselves that these candidates were relatively acceptable. All the first CEOs in the cases studied, 
except for Umzingwane and Makoni, were middle-aged males who had attended the Domboshawa 
Council Secretary Course in the early 1970s. Umzingwane
13
 and Makoni appointed recent graduates 
who were rising in the organisation.       
RDCs were keen to take on their own members of staff for continuity. In any case the councillors of 
the former Rural or District Councils wanted one of their own to safeguard their interests. Because of 
the many uncertainties at amalgamation, RDCs wanted to deal with the ‘devil they knew’. Moreover, 
they could pay the new CEOs low salaries as they set their own salary scales. 
Ten Years Later, What Happened to the CEO’s? 
Having identified the contentious nature of the recruitment process for the first CEOs in the fledgling 
RDCs, the research established the longevity of the CEOs in their respective RDCs (Table 1). A 
'substantive CEO' refers to a new permanent appointment; an 'acting CEO' - entails temporary 
appointment from within either the RDC or the DA's office.  The third column in Table 1, the Acting 
CEO from DA's offices, shows the number of DAs appointed to act as CEOs where for some reason 
the Minister of Local Government directed that the DA be a CEO whilst a problematic situation was 
being taken care of.  The table does not consider the pre-amalgamation scenario where the DAs were 
de jure CEOs. 
Table 1: Profile of CEO longevity: number of CEOs by the RDCs 1993 - 2003: 
RDC No. of Substantive 
CEOs 
No. of acting 
CEOs (from RDC) 
No. of acting 
CEOs (from DA’s 
office) 
 Total  
No.   
CEOs 
Mazowe 3 3 3   9 
Bindura 1 0 0   1 
Mutasa 2 1 3   6 
Makoni 1 0 0   1 
Gwanda 1 0 0   1 
Umzingwane 2 0 0   2 
Chirumhanzi 2 3 2   7 
Gokwe South 2 3 2   7 
TOTAL 14 10 10   34 
Source: Mandiyanike 2006 (excludes acting replacements during vacation, sick leave or short courses) 
                                                          
13 Many insults were traded when the DA, who was also the Acting CEO, tried to preside over the consideration of 
CEO applications when he had also applied. The young SEO cried foul and called for the DA to recuse himself and his 
office from the selection. The process was started afresh and the chairman handled the applications.  
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As reflected in the table above, three RDCs, Bindura, Makoni and Gwanda,
14
 managed to retain the 
first CEOs. The Umzingwane CEO sought greener pastures and resigned after three years, whilst the 
first Mazowe CEO died in 1998.  
In the latter part of 1997, the CEOs for Mutasa, Chirumhanzu and Gokwe South RDCs were 
embroiled in corruption scandals, with the collusion of their chairmen, which rocked their councils to 
the brink of collapse. The CEOs were fired and the respective chairmen sidelined. From the minutes 
analysed, the disciplinary cases for these CEOs created many fissures in the already fragile RDCs 
recovering from the post-partum amalgamation pains. These CEOs had strong connections with the 
political leadership, including some councillors, and an ‘unholy alliance with the council chairmen’.15  
The RDCs were sharply divided on proper disciplinary measures. For example, in Mutasa, after an 
adverse audit report in 1997 implicated the CEO and Treasurer, the RDC held a Finance Committee 
meeting to debate the issue. The Full Council then convened a special meeting (10 February 1998) to 
discuss the audit report and resolved that the CEO and Treasurer should continue working as normal. 
Two days later (12 February 1998), another second special Full Council meeting was held where ‘a 
committee was set up to investigate issues raised in the audit report and have all details ready in a 
week (18 February 1998). Meanwhile the Council resolved that the officers were ‘to continue as 
normal’. The decision to dismiss them was made on 6 March 1998. Thereafter legal battles ensued, 
whereby the officers were challenging the dismissal. In a Council meeting (FC number 3/98) on 30 
April 1998 ‘the chairman appealed to all councillors and the executive not to divulge any information 
on the issue of suspended officers’.16 By December 1999, the issue of the suspended CEO was still 
unresolved. It was on that day (23 December 1999) that Council decided to appoint another 
substantive CEO and that the suspended CEO ‘be dismissed whether he won the case or not’17 
pending approval by the courts. 
The same scenario was witnessed in Gokwe South RDC, where the Special Full Council minutes of 
15 January 1998 (p.2) indicated that the CEO, Mr. Tazvivinga,
18
 was suspended from duty after being 
arrested on allegations of theft and fraud. The Council’s application to dismiss continued for some 
time, and the Gokwe South RDC Full Council minutes of 19 November 1998 reported that he was 
still on suspension. However, 58
th
 Full Council of 27 April 2000 indicated that the Tazvivinga case 
was concluded and that he had been dismissed from the date of suspension. It is noteworthy that from 
                                                          
14
 The CEO was a war veteran together with his chairman. The work of McGregor (2002) may help explain his longevity. 
15 A ministry official during an interview gave this description. 
16 From my experience throughout my service at Guruve RDC (1987 to 1999), I also witnessed a situation where 
some sympathisers would inform the officers concerned on the issues discussed immediately after the meeting. 
17 Mutasa Full Council Minutes FC 5/99 held on 23 December 1999. 
18 He has since died.  
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the sampled RDCs, those RDCs with contentious dismissals of their CEOs were also in line for 
suspension by the Minister.  
CEO Retention: Virtuous or Vicious Leadership Circulation? 
Whilst it is generally expected that employees should remain at one workplace for a long time, ‘the 
concept of a ‘job for life’ has gone ... employees now have a more sophisticated and self-determined 
view of the world of work and their relationship with their employer … people expect greater 
freedom, flexibility and co-operation from the employer’ (KPMG case study 6 January 2005; Rainnie 
1997). As indicated in Table 1, there has been remarkable turnover of the CEO within RDCs.  Summit 
Consultants
19
 (2005) argued that it was vital to see staff turnover for what it was, as an important part 
of any business. It provided the continual renewal of skills and experience, which acts as a motor for 
innovation, longevity and sustainability. It is only when this turnover reaches a scale where it begins 
to have a detrimental effect on the organisation that it becomes a problem. So what is the scale of 
turnover that creates a detrimental effect?  Summit Consultants (2005) argued that the answer was 
different for each organisation, even for different grades of staff within organisations, and suggested 
that it was often better to look at staff turnover in relation to industry averages.  
From the individual profiles obtained from the RDCs, the fourteen Substantive CEOs (Column 1 in 
Table 1) had served a total of 63.5 years during the first decade of amalgamation. The study 
deliberately excluded their service period before amalgamation in to focus primarily in their tenure as 
CEOs. The CEOs have served an average of 4.54 years each. The shortest period was six months, 
while the three longest serving CEOs were in post for ten years. Where RDCs were not able to retain 
their CEOs Council operations were adversely affected by the time taken to recruit another 
substantive CEO and the in-fighting and jostling for the position. Thus, the stop-start scenario stalls 
the momentum for development.  
In Mazowe RDC, the first CEO died in March 1998, and a new CEO had been lined up for 
appointment during 1999. The Mashonaland Central Provincial Administrator’s Report (Monitoring 
visit of Districts December 1999 to February 2000; p.27) noted that: 
Council had made plans (a resolution after the recruitment process) to appoint one of 
their officers who had just graduated from University. At this juncture, the officer looked 
like a natural choice for Council, having grown within the ranks and persevered to 
improve himself in line with changing times. As fate would have it, Council plans were 
interrupted by the publication of audit results for the period soon after amalgamation, 
implicating a number of officers to varying degrees. In the ensuing procedures requiring 
responses, explanations and so on, the Minister intervened and appointed the then DA to 
Acting CEO position.  
                                                          
19 Article “How to use Training As A Retraining Tool”, www.summitconsultants.co.uk/news-
details.asp?fldNewsArticles_ID=109  
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In a separate discussion with an official from the DA’s office, this officer who was to be appointed 
had been aligned with the controversial chairman who was subsequently dismissed. The Provincial 
Administrator’s office recommended that the Minister should not approve the appointment. In the 
meantime, two Acting CEOs held office before the next substantive CEO was eventually appointed in 
July 2001. This new CEO served for six months and resigned for greener pastures. The next 
appointment was made in April 2002 when a substantive CEO was confirmed.
20
  
In Mutasa, the council had a series of legal battles with the CEO from early 1998 until 2001 when 
another CEO was appointed. In the process, there had been two Acting CEOs appointed from the 
DA’s office and one from the Executive Officers. 
Following the dismissal of the Substantive CEO at Chirumhanzi in late 1997, the next substantive 
CEO was appointed only in 2001. Sometime in 1999, the Council had resolved to appoint the Acting 
CEO (the then Executive Officer). However, the Minister did not approve this appointment because 
the recommended candidate did not meet the conditions stipulated in Circular 205,1999. The 
candidate took the Minister to court but lost the case. Another Acting CEO was appointed and served 
the whole of 2000. Early in 2001, a substantive CEO from among the Executive Officers was 
approved and appointed.       
From 1998, when the first Substantive CEO was suspended pending dismissal, to 2002 when another 
Substantive CEO was appointed, Gokwe South RDC had four Acting CEOs (three from among the 
EOs and one DA). Gokwe South was also held up in legal battles with the suspended CEO. The 
Acting CEO who had been appointed (immediately after a CEO suspension) resigned after ten 
months
21
. The next Acting CEO served for a few months before he fell out of favour with some 
councillors and was implicated in a scandal involving a cattle sales register.
22
 The next appointed 
Acting CEO served for a few months again before being implicated in a scam involving getting 
unauthorised fuel and money from a council for his own use and was subsequently involved in a road 
accident with a council vehicle on an unauthorised journey. The DA was appointed in 2000 to finalise 
the cases and pave the way for a new CEO.
23
    
                                                          
20 This new substantive CEO was the same person who had been caught up in the previous political fiasco involving 
the dismissed chairman and had his appointment turned down. At the time of the fieldwork, I was told that the 
political gladiators had left the scene, whereby the chairman had been dismissed, the ego-bruised provincial governor 
had died and the PA had been promoted to another portfolio at Head office. Thus, no-one vetoed his appointment. 
21 She had been with the council for more than ten years. 
22 The register where impounded stray cattle were recorded was suspected to have been meddled with. 
23 It is noteworthy that Gokwe South RDC administrative offices were closed by war veterans on 5th February 2001. 
The war veterans alleged massive maladministration and corruption. A task force was set up and the DA continued to 
Act as CEO and another DA was seconded to be a commissioner to oversee the transfer of Gokwe Urban wards to 
town status. There were also cases of in-fighting between councillors, especially after a council employee who was 
suspended pending dismissal contested council elections and came back as a councillor to become the council 
chairman.    
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There was an equally shaky retention scheme for departmental heads (managerial employees) below 
the CEO level in the RDCs.Hayhurst (2004) rightly observed that recruitment difficulties do not just 
happen at the Chief Executive level. She added that in a tightened job market with skills shortage and 
high vacancy rates, retaining high performing managers at all levels is an increasingly important issue 
for organisations. In all the RDCs sampled for this research, Heads of Departments (HoDs) were quite 
mobile within and outside the respective RDCs. Internally, the HoDs were shuffled and reshuffled 
amongst various departments and were treated as generalists. In other instances, the RDCs made 
efforts to recruit externally.  
Hyder and Thomas (2003) observed that changes in leadership necessitate the re-negotiation of work 
boundaries and established practices with a new leader whilst coming to terms with the loss of the 
dismissed/deceased leader. Nevertheless the politicised and inconsistent manner in which the 
retention has occurred erodes all the gains that could have been realised. Bindura, Makoni and 
Gwanda RDCs showed some consistence and stability. It was also unfortunate that the majority of the 
purges in the affected RDCs occurred at the inception or in the middle of the Rural District Councils' 
Capacity Building program (RD-CBP), with the result that the program lacked strategic leadership 
and continuity. More fire-fighting and crisis management than meaningful learning took place. In a 
study of the international experience in capacity building (CB) and its relevance for Ethiopia, 
Davidson and Pennink (2001; p.65) also dealt with this phenomenon. They observed that: 
Fire fighting is what most local governments are doing – the focus is on current short-
term problems and with limited political will and ability to think of long-term investment 
in managing the necessary change in the system. Fire fighting is in the sense of 
leadership, inspiration, energy, enthusiasm and spreading knowledge. Changing culture 
is what is severely lacking but is badly needed.   
In terms of CEO retention, the cases studied (excluding Makoni, Bindura and Gwanda RDCs) 
exhibited what Davidson and Pennink (2001) aptly described as ‘negative capacity’. This is the 
unproductive absorption of energies and motivation of individuals, but ending up with little as 
tangible output.  
Hayhurst (2004) argued that restructuring, mergers and organisational changes have all contributed to 
the erosion of staff loyalty. She advised that retention did not always have to be expensive because 
rewards could be non-financial, but also some staff turnover is inevitable and could in fact be healthy 
for the organisation, as new employees bring new skills and ideas with them. Low staff turnover could 
also contribute to a lack of promotion opportunities, a static workforce and a lack of innovative 
thinking as bureaucratic inertia sets in. Generally, public sector salaries in Zimbabwe were low and 
the RDC scenario was even worse. There was a very high staff turnover in all the RDCs, especially in 
professional job categories such as engineers and accounts personnel, who had very good chances of 
finding alternative employment. The volatile political environment had compounded staff turnover. 
With trade unions becoming vocal, this was readily associated with the opposition party. The ‘war 
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veterans’ and vigilantes of the ruling ZANU PF party would be handy to ‘purge any malcontents’. 
The work of McGregor (2002) and Hammar (2005) amply demonstrated this point. As a result, fear 
had reached alarming levels. 
Watson (2005) observed that the link between staff development, employee satisfaction and staff 
retention had been established for some time but that many organisations missed out by not treating 
the issue of staff retention strategically. Watson (2005) thus advised that the first step was the 
development of an employee retention strategy that identified the pinch points for the organisation, 
the areas where the organisation regularly suffers high staff turnover, the particular concerns and the 
problems of the targeted staff groups.    
Conclusion 
While RDC employees are not civil servants in terms of the Public Service Commission regulations, 
they may appropriately be called public servants as they serve in the public domain. Thus, the label of 
being a council employee has lesser prestige than a civil servant, though in essence, there is nothing 
qualitatively different between the two.  
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